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STUDYING DECK CHAIRS ON THE TITANIC 
William L. Reynoldst & William M. Richmantt 
INTRODUCTION 
Learned Hand would not recognize today's federal appellate 
courts. In order to cope with a rapidly growing caseload, circuit 
judges no longer hear argument or write published opinions in half of 
the cases appealed to them, and they delegate much of their work to 
large numbers of clerks and staff, "para-judges," who are supervised in 
varying degrees by the judges themselves. The burden of these trun-
cated procedures, what we called "Track-Two" justice, of course, has 
fallen disproportionately on the poorest and least sophisticated fed-
eral litigants. 
The federal judicial establishment has resolutely resisted advocat-
ing the obvious solution-adding large numbers of new judges. In 
resisting that solution, the establishment has relied on arguments 
which neither make intuitive sense nor are supported by empirical 
research. Indeed, the arguments against expansion are often made in 
the teeth of well-known evidence to the contrary. We believe such 
unreasoned obduracy can only be explained by a desire to preserve 
the judges' own professional comfort and status, commodities that for 
some judges vary inversely with the size of the judiciary. The judges' 
desire to protect their status should not count for much, however, 
when balanced against the nation's dire need for substantial addi-
tional appellate capacity and the injustice of the currently uneven dis-
tribution of appellate court resources. 
We wrote extensively about these changes and arguments in an 
article published earlier in this Review.1 Professor Carl Tobias now has 
responded in a thoughtful fashion to our arguments. 2 His establish-
mentarian essay vividly illustrates the gulf between those who wish to 
temporize, and those who believe that the pathology of the circuit 
courts demands more urgent attention. 
t Jacob A France Professor of Judicial Process, University of Maryland School of Law. 
tt Professor, University of Toledo School of Law. Our thanks to David Hyman and 
Jennifer Rohr for reading a draft of this Article. 
1 William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certia-
rari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 273 (1996). 
2 Carl Tobias, The New Certiorari and a National Study of the Circuits, 81 CoRNELL L. 
REv. 1264 (1996). 
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I 
DESCRIPTION 
A. The Review They Require 
1291 
Although Professor Tobias acknowledges that our description of 
the appellate process in the circuit courts is largely accurate, 3 he dis-
putes several of our findings. The most significant area of disagree-
ment is whether cases currently receiving "Track-Two" appellate 
justice (decision without oral argument in a brief, unpublished opin-
ion drafted by staff attorneys) receive the review "which they re-
quire."4 Tobias suggests that many of these cases, particularly fact-
dependent pro se cases and social security appeals, do not require the 
full panoply of appellate procedures and that more elaborate consid-
eration of them would not improve appellate decisionmaking.s 
Professor Tobias apparently uses unchanged outcome as the stan-
dard for the sufficiency of appellate procedure: If increased appellate 
procedure would not alter the decision in a case, then it is not "re-
quired."6 Even under this standard, he is probably wrong. It is, of 
course, difficult to show that the outcome of any appeal would be dif-
ferent if the judges had considered the case more carefully, but there 
is circumstantial evidence suggesting that at least some results would 
change. Some cases decided by the truncated procedures are rever-
sals of district court judgments, and some have produced split votes-
and even concurring and dissenting opinions-on the appellate 
panel. 7 In these cases there was some legal or factual controversy, and 
increased scrutiny by the appellate judges might well have changed a 
single vote and, thus, an outcome. 
Far more important, however, is recognition that the unchanged 
outcome test is the wrong standard for measuring the propriety of 
"Track-Two" justice. Full appellate procedure produces benefits be-
yond insuring correct outcomes by providing visibility, accountability, 
and reviewability in ways that truncated procedures cannot. 8 In par-
3 /d. at 1267-69. 
4 /d. at 1269. 
5 !d. at 1269-70. 
6 !d. ("More consideration may not improve appellate decisionmaking generally or 
the outcome in many specific appeals which judges now address less thoroughly."). 
7 See William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication 
in the United States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Refonn, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 573, 612-21 
(1981). 
8 See jUDITH A McKENNA, FEDERAL jUDICIAL OrR., STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNA-
TIVES FOR THE FEDERAL CouRTS oF APPEALS: REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CoNGRESs AND 
THE jUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 155-56 (1993) (noting that restoration of 
visibility and accountability can only be accomplished by either reducing the number of 
appeals or massively increasing judicial system resources); William L. Reynolds & William 
M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the 
United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1167, 1199-1204 (1978) (arguing that 
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ticular, oral argument and published opinions reassure litigants, par-
ticularly those most inclined to distrust government officials, that the 
judges themselves have carefully considered their appeals. Moreover, 
selective distribution of full appellate procedure decreases confidence 
in the legal system, and it causes many to suspect that the law has in 
fact become a "respecter of persons" and that the judges are not pro-
viding equal justice to poor and rich alike.9 
Finally, trends in argument and opinion publication strongly sug-
gest that caseload pressures, rather than the trivialjty of appeals, drive 
the increased use of "Track-Two" procedures. In the last twenty years, 
as caseload pressures have increased, the percentage of cases disposed 
of after argument by a published opinion has declined in all catego-
ries of litigation, not just those widely believed to be less meritori-
ous.10 Are we really to believe that the quality of antitrust, tax, and 
diversity appeals has diminished in that time? If not, it seems clear 
that the judges' tendency to regard a case as "trivial" or "unmeritori-
ous" is a function of the caseload pressures under which they oper-
ate.11 In other words, they have allowed the small size of the judiciary 
to dictate the available amount of high quality justice, rather than ad-
vocating judicial expansion to ensure high quality justice for all cases. 
More simply, judges have allowed the size of the tool to dictate the 
size of the job, rather than vice versa.12 
unpublished opinions reduce judicial responsibility, accountability, and the likelihood of 
reviewability); William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Appellate Justice Bureaucracy and 
SclwU:zrship, 21 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 623, 630-36 (1988) (arguing that unpublished opinions 
and lack of oral argument combine to reduce judicial accountability); Lauren K. Robel, 
Caseload andJudging:JudicialAdaptations to Caseload, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REv. 3, 56-57 (discussing 
the effect high caseloads have on accountability). 
9 28 U.S.C. § 453 (1994) (requiring that each justice or judge "administer justice 
without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich"). Professor 
Tobias also suggests that our claim of unequal access to high quality appellate justice lacks 
empirical support. Tobias, supra note 2, at 1273. In fact, however, numerous studies and 
data collected annually by the Administrative Office of the Courts consistently show that 
prisoner cases, pro se cases, and social security appeals are disproportionately likely to 
receive what we have called "Track-Two" appellate justice rather than the traditional 
model. See, e.g., Robel, supra note 8, at 61 tbl. 2 (argument), 65 tbl. 5 (publication). 
10 See McKENNA, supra note 8, at 43-44, 47-48. 
11 Anecdotal evidence also supports the conclusion that cases that would have re-
ceived full appellate treatment a generation ago do not receive it today. See Richman & 
Reynolds, supra note 1, at 274-76, 278-79. 
12 See id. at 281 (describing published opinions as "'once the hallmark of the appel-
late courts' work'") (quoting Edith H. Jones, Back to the Future for Federal Appeals Courts: 
Rationing Federal Justice lJy Recovering Limited Jurisdiction, 73 TEX. L. REv. 1485, 1492 ( 1995)); 
see also id. at 282 n.39 (describing published opinions as "the 'working tool of lawyers and 
the building block of judges'") ( quotingJohn Reid, Doe Did Not Sit-The Creation of Opinions 
lJy an Artist, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 59, 59 ( 1963)). 
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B. The Responsibility of the Judges 
Professor Tobias also disputes our assessment of the responsibility 
of the circuit bench for the transformation of the courts of appeals. 
Here he carefully refutes several claims that we were quite careful not 
to make.13 
For instance, we did not maintain that the circuit judges are the 
only actors who bear considerable responsibility for the change. As 
Tobias points out, Congress and the litigants bear chief responsibility 
for the caseload glut, to which the courts responded by truncating the 
appellate process.14 Nor did we suggest that the circuit bench unani-
mously supported the transformation of the circuit courts into courts 
of de facto discretionary jurisdiction. We acknowledged and ap-
plauded the few judges who have spoken out against the transforma-
tion and in favor of a much larger circuit bench.15 
Given the possibility for confusion as demonstrated by the Tobias 
reply, it is helpful to restate precisely our assessment of the responsi-
bility of the circuit judiciary for the transformation of the circuit 
courts. It can be reduced to two propositions: 
(1) The circuit judges bear almost exclusive16 responsibility for re-
sponding to the caseload glut by devising, instituting, and allocating 
unequally among the cases the set of appeal expediting procedures 
(reduced oral argument, limited publication, and use of central 
staff) that we have termed ''Track Two" appellate justice or the New 
Certiorari.17 
13 See Tobias, supra note 2, at 1270-72. 
14 Id. 
15 See, e.g., Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 274 (quoting Judge Reinhardt's criti-
cism of federal judges who cannot let go of the notion that Circuit Courts are small, pris-
tine, and sheltered); id. at 299 n.129 (citing Judges King's and Reinhardt's calls for 
expansion of the bench); id. at 329-30 n.265, 332-33 n.283 (quoting Justice, then Chief 
Judge, Breyer's arguments that jurisdictional retrenchment will not forestall the need for 
expansion); id. at 338 (quoting Judge Wallace deploring the elitism of the anti-expansion 
arguments); id. at 321-22 n.228 (quoting Judge Haynsworth's argument that the judges' 
concern for prestige should not deter the growth of the bench). 
While the judges cited above have supported expansion, their views have not con-
trolled the institutional position of the circuit bench. The policy and planning apparatus 
of the circuit bench, what we have called the "Judicial Establishment," consisting of the 
Judicial Conference of the United States; the Judicial Councils of the several circuits; the 
Judicial Conference Committee on Courts, Administration and Case Management; the ju-
dicial Conference Committee on Long Range Planning; and members of the Federal 
Courts Study Committee, as well as several outspoken and influential individual judges 
(e.g., Judges Newman, Tjoflat,Jones, and Parker) have all argued forcefully for restricting 
the size of the circuit bench. See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 299, 307, 329. 
16 Their responsibility is not exclusive because Congress has implicitly approved the 
expediting strategies by failing to reverse them legislatively and by funding them (e.g., by 
allocating money for staff attorney positions). 
17 Professor Tobias seems to agree. See Tobias, supra note 2, at 1272. (characterizing 
the circuit judges' responsibility as "much responsibility"). 
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(2) The policy and planning apparatus of the federal judiciary, as 
well as many prominent circuit judges (a set of individuals and 
groups that we have called the Judicial Establishment), have lobbied 
forcefully and successfully against an expansion of the circuit bench 
commensurate with the caseload increase. 
The second proposition is far more noteworthy. Just as it is news 
when man bites dog, it is remarkable when federal judges, historically 
protectors of the powerless and conservators of the Learned Hand 
Tradition, lobby against allocating the resources required to assure 
high quality appellate justice in every case on the docket. 
C. The Judges' Reasons 
Tobias's final objection to our description of the courts of ap-
peals concerns the judges' reasons for opposing expansion. He finds 
those reasons more defensible than we do.18 Inclined to see the 
judges as conscientious, dedicated jurists, he believes their opposition 
to expansion is based not on elitism and dignitary interests, but on 
concern about fragmentation of federal law and loss of collegiality.19 
We agree that the judges are conscientious and dedicated, and 
that they have argued against expansion by citing concerns about col-
legiality and fragmented federal law. Indeed, we considered those ar-
guments at length and, we believe, refuted them decisively.20 The 
transparent weakness of the arguments caused us to consider other 
motives. The evidence for the elitism charge, however, comes largely 
from the judges' own words. Judge Jones, for instance, compares the 
judges to elite athletes: 
[A]s the docket is "dumbed-down" by an ovenvhelming number of 
routine or trivial appeals, judges become accustomed to seeking 
routine methods of case disposition. Their mental and organiza-
tional flexibility, so vital for performing the federal courts' classic 
tasks of defending the Constitution and harmonizing federal law, 
inevitably suffers. The situation is like that of a competitive tennis 
player forced to spend the bulk of his time rallying with novices. 
Just as the player's competitive edge will erode from lack of peer 
contact, so are judges' legal talents jeopardized by a steady diet of 
minor appeals.21 -
Judge Newman worries that expansion would cause the circuit bench 
to descend to the level of state judiciaries: 
IS ld. at 1273. 
19 Id. 
20 Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 307-25. 
21 Edith H. Jones, Back to the Future for Federal Appeals Courts: Rationing Federal justice Uj 
Recovering Limited jurisdiction, 73 TEX. L. REv. 1485, 1493 (1995). 
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A federal judiciary of 3,000 to 4,000 would include some extremely 
able people and a large number of competent people. But it would 
also include an unacceptable number of mediocre and even a few 
unqualified people. Today, most observers regard the overall qual-
ity of the federal judiciary as higher than that of the average state 
judiciary. At a size of 3,000 to 4,000, its quality would be indistin-
guishable from the most pedestrian of state judiciaries. 22 
Chief Justice Rehnquist deplores the "ever-increasing caseload with an 
ever-larger percentage . . . of relatively routine work which neither 
requires nor engages the abilities of a first-rate judge,"23 while Justice 
Scalia worries that a larger bench "only dilutes the prestige of the of-
fice and 'aggravates the problem of image."'24 
The proposals for jurisdictional contraction also support the 
charge of elitism. The cases targeted by the Federal Courts Study 
Committee and the Committee on Long Range Planning of the Judi-
cial Conference are mostly the small-stakes cases brought by the 
poorest and least sophisticated federal litigants: diversity cases below 
a large amount in controversy, ERISA cases where the amount in con-
troversy is $10,000 or less, prison civil rights litigation, social security 
cases, employment discrimination suits, and FELA and Jones Act 
appeals.25 
In summary, although we agree with Tobias that the circuit 
judges are, by and large, a conscientious and dedicated group, their 
anti-expansionist rhetoric, their specific proposals for jurisdictional re-
trenchment, and their refusal to consider contrary evidence, compel 
us to stand by the charge of elitism. 
II 
PRESCRIPTION 
Although Tobias largely agrees with our description of the prob-
lem, he disagrees with our prescription-more judges. He believes 
that our solution will have bad consequences, that other remedies are 
better, and that significant expansion is politically impossible. The 
first two arguments are wrong, and the last although problematic, cer-
22 Jon 0. Newman, 1000 Judges-The Limit for an Effective Federal judiciary, 76 JuDICA-
TURE 187, 188 (1993). We considered the question of whether enough "qualified" judges 
could be found in Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 300-01. 
23 Carolyn D. King, Comment, A Matter of Conscience, 28 Hous. L. REv. 955, 961 (1991) 
(quoting remarks made by Chief Justice Rehnquist in his 1976 speech to the American Bar 
Association). 
24 Stuart Taylor, Scalia Proposes Major Overhaul of the U.S. Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 
1987, at A1, A12. 
25 REPoRT oF THE FED. Crs. STUDY CoMM. 42-44, 48-50, 55-58, 60-63 (1990); CoMMIT-
TEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, Jun. CONF. OF THE U.S., PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR 
THE FEDERAL COURTS 27-35 (1995) [hereinafter COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING]. 
HeinOnline -- 81 Cornell L. Rev. 1296 1995-1996
1296 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81:1290 
tainly cannot excuse the failure of the Judicial Establishment to ask 
Congress to adopt the best solution to the caseload problem. 
A. The Bad Consequences of Expansion 
Tobias opposes our prescription for radical enlargement of the 
judiciary .because he fears it would lead to bad consequences. 26 Spe-
cifically, he argues that expansion will reduce judicial collegiality, will 
further fragment the law in the circuit courts, "might not enhance 
decisionmaking generally," and will increase the work of the Clerks' 
Offices.27 
1. Collegiality 
Tobias first focuses on the reduced collegiality he believes would 
be a necessary result of expansion. Tobias does not define "collegial-
ity" (not an easy task to perform), and he does not explain why we 
should worry about its loss. More specifically, he does not explain why 
collegiality enhances either the quality or equality of judicial decision-
making. He merely suggests in a single sentence of text that loss of 
collegiality is an evil that would attend expansion. 28 Because he exam-
ines neither the evidence nor the arguments we advanced on this 
point, it is hard to see how Tobias's remarks on collegiality advance 
the inquiry. 
We argued at some length that the available evidence suggests 
that collegiality on the circuit courts is a myth.29 Judges, it turns out, 
rarely talk about cases after the post-argument conference. This pro-
cedural lacuna is not a function of size; apparently it does not matter 
whether courts are large or small, or whether they are centrally lo-
cated or geographically dispersed-judges simply do not spend much 
time talking among themselves about their cases. 30 
More important, we argued that there is no evidence or reason to 
believe that collegiality enhances the quality of appellate decision 
making. 31 Indeed, it could have quite the reverse effect. After all, 
strong disagreements among close friends can be uncomfortable; for 
that reason, a collegial court is likely to be a conservative court. There 
is no reason to believe, therefore, that regardless of how pleasant it 
may be, a collegial court dispenses better justice. 
26 Tobias, supra note 2, at 1275-77. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 1275. 
29 Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 323-25. 
30 Id. at 324. Tobias also fails to mention the most serious "collegiality" problem on 
today's circuit courts-the relation between a judge and the numerous and rapidly grow-
ing central staff and personal clerks who do the great bulk of the work. 
31 Id. 
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Finally, we argued that it is by no means clear that collegiality, 
valuable or not, is a function of size.32 There is, for instance, simply 
no evidence that collegiality is impossible in a large circuit such as the 
Ninth (often used as a bete noire by the Establishment) ,33 nor that col-
legiality is more abundant in small circuits.34 
In lieu of evidence, therefore, there remains only the simple as-
sertion, repeated by Tobias, that collegiality is a good thing and that 
enlargement would seriously damage it. In short, collegiality has be-
come a mantra-a charm to be incanted against the evil of expansion. 
We had hoped that our lengthy treatment of the issue would advance 
the argument beyond that point. In the end, therefore, the only thing 
clear about collegiality is that the judges may prefer life on a smaller, 
more comfortable court.35 We believe this is not a significant consid-
eration-certainly not one worth the sacrifice of the Learned Hand 
tradition. 
2. Balkanization: Unstable Law 
The second bad consequence that Tobias predicts will result from 
expansion is the "Balkanization" of federallaw.36 Expansion, he ar-
gues, would require more circuits, which could "further splinter the 
already Balkanized federal law," that is, produce more circuit splits on 
issues of federal law that in tum would encourage more litigation and 
more appeals.37 Tobias, however, supports his argument only with 
conclusory assertions. 38 
Once again, we critiqued this family of arguments at length,39 
and it is hard to see how Tobias's summary restatement responds to 
our critique or advances the inquiry. In particular, we showed that 
the Balkanization argument lacks empirical support: The available ev-
idence from several studies shows no link between legal inconsistency 
and circuit size or between circuit size and rates of appeal. Further, 
32 Id. at 324-25. 
33 See, e.g., Gerald Tjoflat, More Judges, Less Justice, 79 ABA J., July 1993, at 70, 72 
(addressing the difficulties faced by the Ninth Circuit as a "jumbo court"). 
34 Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 323-25. 
35 Even this may not be true. A larger court can submerge personal animosities which 
might be distracting and discomforting on a small court. A larger court is also more likely 
to have minority and women members in significant numbers than is a small court. See 
Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 339-40. It is also more likely to be diverse geographi-
cally. See id. It may be that judges do not like having "others" (at least in large numbers ) 
in their club, but enhanced diversity certainly will be a major by-product of rapid expan-
sion. Tobias does not address our argument based on enhanced diversity. 
36 Tobias, supra note 2, at 1275-76. 
37 Id. 
38 Tobias, for example, does not even mendon the seminal studies conducted by Ar-
thur Hellman, and discussed at length in Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 308-14. 
Those studies are devastating for proponents of the Balkanization argument. 
39 Id. at 307-23. 
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the only systematic studies of intra as well as inter-circuit conflict 
found neither to be a significant problem.4o 
We also showed that the Balkanization argument is subject to a 
serious reductio ad absurdum attack.41 If that argument is correct and 
more judges are bad, then fewer judges should be better. In other 
words, anyone who believes the Balkanization argument to be valid 
should be calling for a reduction in the current number of judges and 
opinions in order to further the coherence and consistency goals. 
Opponents of expansion do not explore the question of the desired 
amount of consistency (one panel for the whole nation, perhaps) nor 
do they offer any principled suggestion of the proper balance between 
the competing goals of perfect legal consistency and adequate appel-
late capacity. 
Finally, the emphasis of the Balkanization argument is misplaced. 
It wrongly assumes that coherence-that is, law declaration-is the 
primary goal of the federal appellate courts. Those courts, however, 
originally were established as error correcting courts, and law declara-
tion was to play a secondary role.42 Although the importance of the 
latter function has increased over the years, the circuit courts remain 
the only federal tribunals that review for error below. The judges may 
prefer to hear the cases where they declare law, but their primary task 
is to check the awesome power possessed by the individual district 
judges. 
Although we reviewed and rejected the arguments based on Bal-
kanization43 in our earlier articles, Professor Tobias, like the Judicial 
Establishment generally, insists on summarily restating them.44 Bal-
kanization, in other words, like collegiality, has become nothing more 
than a mantra. As we indicated in the preceding discussions of col-
legiality, it is difficult to form a response except to point out that it 
does not advance the discussion to repeat summarily an argument 
that has been analyzed and refuted in detail. Continued reliance on 
the Balkanization and collegiality arguments under such circum-
stances naturally creates suspicion about the judiciary's real motives 
for opposing expansion. 
40 ld. at 312-14. 
41 Id. at 314-16. 
42 See Paul D. Carrington, The Function of the Civil Appeal: A Late-Century Vzew, 38 S.C. 
L. REv. 411, 424-25 (1987). 
43 We also showed that consistency could be pursued by methods other than perma-
nently stunting the nation's appellate capacity. Such methods include better legislation, 
improved communication among judges, increased use of specialized courts and panels, 
and another tier of courts. See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 316-23. 
44 See Tobias, supra note 2, at 1275-76. 
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3. Wasting Resources 
Tobias also suggests that expansion of the appellate courts might 
not be desirable because it would be wasteful unless doing so might 
improve results in individual cases.45 This argument suffers from twu 
fatal flaws. 
First, it is impossible to determine whether different decision-
making procedures would change the result in a specific case. We do 
know, however, that some cases receive significant attention from Arti-
cle III judges, and some do not.46 We believe that increased judicial 
attention to the latter cases necessarily will improve the quality of the 
decisionmaking in them. This, we hope, is obvious. The President 
nominates and the Senate confirms Article III judges on the basis of 
their training, intelligence, character, and judgment. It is very diffi-
cult to believe that the clerks and central staff have those same quali-
ties-at least not to the degree possessed by Senate confirmed judges. 
If they do not, then increased judicial attention will necessarily im-
prove the quality of appellate decisionmaking. 
Once again, however, the more important point is that Tobias 
fails to address our fairness argument. As we have said many times, 
even if outcomes would not change, we believe that a basic right of 
each litigant is to be treated as equal ·with all others who appear in 
federal courts. It is this belief that sets us fundamentally apart from 
the Judicial Establishment. 
4. Overworked Clerks 
It is difficult to know what to make of Tobias's argument that 
expansion is bad because it will increase the work of the clerks' of-
fices.47 It is unclear how expansion would disproportionately increase 
the work of those offices. Increased use of oral argument might in-
crease scheduling duties somewhat, but publishing more opinions 
should have little or no effect. Moreover, a marked reduction in cen-
tral staff and personal law clerks might actually reduce the work of the 
clerks' offices. 
Much more fundamentally, the overworked clerks argument 
raises the basic question of whether the courts exist to benefit society 
45 !d. at 1276-77. 
46 Although most lawyers are not aware of the full nature of this delegation, it is quite 
well documented. See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 279-97. 
We feel a good deal of irony in reporting this development. Both of the authors 
clerked for federal district judges in the 1970s. In those days, the roles were largely re-
versed: The clerks devoted most of their attention to complex civil litigation; our judges 
primarily handled the pro se, prisoner, and social security claims. Both of our judges are 
well respected within the federal judiciary. Neither felt it beneath his dignity to delve 
personally into the claims of the poor and powerless. 
47 Tobias, supra note 2, at 1277. 
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or themselves. If it is the former, then concern over the burdens of 
the clerks' offices is legitimate only if the workload threatens to de-
stroy irreparably the efficient operation of those administrators. To-
bias presents no evidence that such destruction is inevitable or even 
probable. Thus, the argument misses the central point. The clerks' 
offices should be large enough to handle properly the basic work of 
the court; their size should not dictate how the judges go about dis-
pensing justice. If preserving equal access to the Learned Hand tradi-
tion is worth doubling the size of the circuit bench, it is surely worth 
extra help in the clerks' offices.4s 
B. Other Remedies 
Our proposed remedy to the problem of two-track appellate jus-
tice, a radical increase in the size of the circuit bench, can be evalu-
ated only by comparison to other possible remedies. Professor Tobias 
suggests that alternative reforms could remedy the problem at consid-
erably lower cost. In particular, he proposes greater specialization, 
public funding of counsel for pro se litigants, and the use of three-
judge panels of district judges for low-level error correction.49 
Specialization is a useful strategy which we and others have con-
sidered in some detail.50 Specialized panels or courts using existing 
circuit judgeships would conserve judicial resources because judges 
who concentrate on particular types of cases presumably would work 
more efficiently. The order of magnitude of the savings, however, is 
far too small to solve the problem of caseload glut in the courts of 
appeals without significant increases in judgeships. 5 1 
An alternative, of course, is for Congress to create new specialized 
courts or panels to handle specific portions of the circuit courts' dock-
ets. We have no principled objection to this solution; it is basically our 
prescription-a large increase in appellate capacity-with a different 
48 The incremental cost of adding personnel to the clerks' offices would constitute a 
tiny portion of the total amount to be spent on new judgeships. If high quality appellate 
justice is worth the major expense of the new judgeships, surely it is worth the minor 
additional expense of a few extra functionaries. 
49 See Tobias, supra note 2, at 1277-79. 
50 See, e.g., THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING jUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE 
U.S. CouRTS OF APPEALS 221-23 (1994); PAuL D. CARru:NGTON ET AL.,JusncE ON APPEAL 167-
84 (1976); McKENNA, supra note 8, at 118-21; Daniel]. Meador, A Challenge to judicial Archi-
tecture: ModifYing the RegionalDesign of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 603, 607-
15, 634 (1989); Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 319-20. 
51 As we have shown, the Courts of Appeals need an increase of almost 100 judge-
ships-about 60% of the current total-to meet current staffing models. See Richman & 
Reynolds, supra note 1, at 299. It is highly unlikely that efficiency gains from specialization 
could substantially reduce a shortfall of that magnitude. 
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label. It is thus better viewed as a way of accommodating expansion of 
the judiciary rather than as an alternative to that expansion. 52 
Another alternative proposed by Tobias is appellate review by 
threejudge panels of district judges. 5 3 Once again, however, this solu-
tion will require additional judgeships-albeit at the district, rather 
than circuit level-in order to make a significant dent in the caseload 
glut and thus permit full consideration of all appeals. 54 It is basically a 
variation of the four-tier theme that we have already endorsed;55 it just 
adds the fourth tier between the district and circuit levels rather than 
between the circuit and Supreme Court levels. Its financial costs 
should be the same as conventional appellate expansion, but, like any 
four-tier system, it offers a potential advantage for the declaration of 
federal law.56 It is hard to see any advantage that it has over other 
four-tier systems, except perhaps some savings in the circuit judges' 
status and prestige, but we question whether those are values worth 
very serious consideration. 
It is important, however, not to lose track of the basic point. If 
specialization or a four-tier system is to have any meaningful effect on 
caseload and thus on the New Certiorari, either innovation must in-
clude a substantial increase in judgeships. Thus, either option should 
be viewed as a species of, rather than as an alternative to, our proposal 
for radical expansion of the circuit bench. 
Tobias' third proposal-providing legal representation for pro se 
litigants57-is a different kettle of fish. Presumably, implementation 
of this proposal will head off or streamline appellate litigation by pro-
52 It is possible to see how this alternative responds to the anxieties of the anti-expan-
sionists. Increasing the number of judges by creating specialized courts still entails the 
same monetary costs as conventional expansion, but it threatens the coherence of federal 
law less because the additional judges could work only on specific types of cases. Such an 
alternative might also minimize concerns about status and prestige, particularly if the new 
judges are appointed under Article I, but that would produce another difficulty: Article III 
judges (U.S. District judges) being reviewed by Article I judges. 
Solving the problem by using specialized courts to treat social security, prisoner, and 
pro se cases does not completely eliminate the problem of two-track appellate justice, but 
the "Track-Two" cases would at least get full consideration, albeit from other judges. Fur-
ther, if the dichotomy were approved by Congress, it would eliminate the lawless element 
of the current system in the courts of appeals. 
53 Tobias, supra note 2, at 1278-79. 
54 It might not require quite as many new judgeships as would be required by an 
expansion of the current bench. The widespread use of district judges as circuit court 
visitors, discussed in Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 287, suggests that the circuit 
judges believe the trial courts are less burdened. Thus, some may have additional time to 
allocate to appellate functions and, as such, fewer new positions may be requested. 
55 See id. at 321-23. 
56 A four-tier system provides a large base for the appellate pyramid thereby assuring 
adequate numbers of error correctors as well as a narrow apex to focus law declaration. 
The result is enough judges to afford full appellate procedure to all claims while still maxi-
mizing the coherence and consistency of federal law. See id at 321. 
57 Tobias, supra note 2, at 1278. 
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viding pro se litigants with advice about the weakness of their claims. 
However, this proposal is unlikely to solve the problems of appellate 
glut or the New Certiorari. For one thing, it will likely carry very high 
financial and political costs. A public defender or legal aid attorney 
can be expected to handle only thirty to fifty appeals a year;58 a fed-
eral circuit court judge is expected to participate in 255 cases per 
year. 59 It requires a panel of three judges to hear and decide an ap-
peal. Dividing 255 by three yields 85, which is thus the number of 
terminations allocable annually to each circuit judgeship. A compari-
son of these two workload figures makes it apparent that the appellate 
process (for relatively simple, high volume cases) requires about two 
lawyers for every judge. 
Perhaps the idea is that fewer attorneys would be required be-
cause many pro se litigants would give up after advice by counsel, but 
experience with pro se litigants suggests a more likely hypothesis. 
Many would speak to the appellate lawyer, hear her advice about the 
futility of appeal, and insist on proceeding anyway or jettison the attor-
ney and appeal pro se, thus forfeiting the savings in judge-time. 
Would we then cut off the right to proceed prose? Further, adding 
lawyers to the litigation process seldom speeds things up. In at least 
some pro se cases, a zealous advocate would likely find issues worthy 
enough to take the case out of the "Track-Two" docket and thus ex-
pend more judge-time. It is hard to see how a net savings could result. 
Even if it could, where would the funds come from to recruit, 
hire, and administer the several hundred lawyers required to run the 
program? Tobias mentions legal aid offices and law school clinics,60 
but those offices are financially strapped nowadays and not looking 
for extra work. Eventually the money would have to come from the 
public fisc; and trying to sell a budget-minded Congress on funding a 
whole new cadre of government lawyers for indigent and pro se appel-
late litigants is a fool's errand if ever there was one. 
C. Political Impossibility 
Tobias's third critique of our solution is that massive increases in 
the circuit bench are politically unrealistic.61 Congress, he asserts, will 
never approve the expenditure.62 This point is curious in that Con-
gress regularly approves nearly all of the judgeships requested by the 
58 Telephone interview with Bob Burke, Staff Attorney, Defender Division, National 
Legal Aid and Defenders' Association (May 6, 1996); telephone interview with Dennis M. 
Hendersen, Chief Attorney, Appellate Division, Maryland Office of the Public Defender 
(May 6, 1996). 
59 See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 298 n.126. 
60 Tobias, supra note 2, at 1278. 
61 Id. at 1279-80. 
62 Id. 
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Judicial Conference. To date, the problem has not been getting Con-
gress to approve the positions; rather, it has been getting the courts to 
ask for them. 63 The judges could make a very appealing case, citing 
the chronic shortage of judgeships according to current staffing mod-
els and their own failed attempts to provide high quality justice with-
out adequate Article III personnel. 
Tobias also cites political opposition from the judiciary. 54 Here, 
he seems to misunderstand the purpose of our article. We attempted 
to neutralize the political opposition from the judiciary. We hoped 
that fair-minded jurists, exposed to the factual and logical flaws in the 
anti-expansionist arguments and to the elitism of the anti-expansionist 
rhetoric, would abandon both. Further, we suspect that the anti-ex-
pansionist stance is not the position of the majority of circuit judges, 
but rather that of a vocal and powerful minority. If our assertion is 
correct, we hope our article will encourage the remaining judges to 
tell Congress that they would welcome the help required to return the 
circuit courts to the tradition of Learned Hand and to the goal of 
equal justice for all litigants. 65 
III 
YET ANoTHER STUDY 
Instead of an immediate move to expand the circuit bench, Pro-
fessor Tobias argues that the complexity of the problems of the circuit 
courts requires yet another m~or study.66 His proposed "National 
Study Commission" would identify "the most troubling complications 
that rising appeals are causing and that the appellate courts are fac-
ing, the precise sources and effects of the problems, and the most 
efficacious combination of solutions. "67 This would be a most ambi-
tious project, involving members of Congress, federal judges, Execu-
tive Branch Officials, members of the public, and a "staff of full-time 
professionals."68 The goal of this expensive and lengthy undertaking 
would be to reach a consensus about a number of issues on which 
consensus either has existed for many decades-equal justice for ali-
or on which no consensus is possible-a cost/benefit analysis of 
collegiality. 
Tobias's solution is a recipe for further delay, for the fundamen-
tal transformation of the federal appellate process is an issue that has 
63 See generally Perspectives on Court-Congress Relations: The Vzew from the Hill and the Fed-
eral Bench, 79 juDICATURE 303, 304 (1996) (noting that the judiciary's budget was increased 
5% in fiscal year 1996, despite general cutbacks amid deficit worries). 
64 Tobias, supra note 2, at 1280. 
65 See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 1, at 342. 
66 Tobias, supra note 2, at 1281. 
67 Id. at 1283. 
68 Id. at 1284-85. 
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been studied to death. 69 The causes, effects, and possible solutions to 
the demise of the Learned Hand tradition are very well known. The 
past quarter-century has seen any number of blue-ribbon studies 
which have examined all or part of the crisis in the federal appellate 
system.70 Those studies include reports made by the American Law 
Institute (1969),71 the American Bar Foundation (1968),72 the Freund 
Committee (1972),73 the Hruska Commission (1973),74 the Advisory 
Council on Appellate Justice (1975),75 the Hruska Commission 
(1975),76 the American Bar Association Action Commission (1980),77 
the Department of Justice (1977),78 the New York University Study 
(1986),79 the Federal Courts Study Commission (1990),8° the Ameri-
can Bar Association Standing Committee on Federal Judicial Improve-
ments (1989),81 and the Committee on Long Range Planning of the 
Judicial Conference of the United States (1994).82 There has been a 
good deal of academic writing on the problem as well. 
These studies have produced a small library shelf of reports, but 
no effective solution to the problem of two-track justice in the circuit 
69 See BAKER, supra note 50, at 303-426 (providing an extensive bibliography of books 
and articles pertaining to the United States Courts of Appeals through january 1993). 
70 See id. at 34-43 (summarizing these reports). 
71 AMERICAN LAw INST., STUDY OF TiiE DIVISION oF juRismcnoN BETWEEN STATE AND 
FEDERAL COURTS (1969). 
72 See AMERICAN BAR FoUND., AccoMMODATING TiiE WoRKLOAD oF THE UNITED STATES 
COURTS OF .APPEALS: REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS (1968). 
73 See FEDERAL juD. CTR., REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON TiiE CAsELOAD OF THE 
SuPREME CouRT (1972), reprinted in 57 F.RD. 573 (1973). 
74 See COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FED. CRT. APPELLATE SYS., THE GEOGRAPHICAL 
BouNDARIES OF THE SEVERAL jUDICIAL CIRCUITS: REcoMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1973), 
reprinted in 62 F.RD. 223 (1974). 
75 See 1-5 ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR APPELLATE juST., APPELLATE JUSTICE: 1975, MATERIALS 
FOR A NATIONAL CONFERENCE, SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNtA (1975). 
76 See COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FED. CRT. APPELLATE SYS., STRUCTURE AND IN· 
TERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1975), reprinted in 67 F.RD. 195 
(1976). 
77 See Seth Hufstedler & Paul Nejelski, A.B.A. Action Commission Challenges Litigation 
Cost and Delay, 66 AB.A. J. 965 (1980) (discussing the study undertaken by the American 
Bar Association Action Commission to Reduce Court Costs and Delay). 
78 See DEPARTMENT OF jUST. COMM. ON REVISION OF THE FED. juD. SYS., THE NEEDS OF 
TiiE FEDERAL CouRTS (1977). 
79 See New York Univer.sity Supreme Court Project, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 677-1929 (1984). 
80 See Maurice Rosenberg, The Federal Courts in the 21st Century, 15 NovA L. REv. 105 
(1991) (discussing the report by the Federal Courts Study Committee). 
81 AMERICAN BAR Ass'N STANDING COMM. ON FED. jUD. IMPROVEMENTS, THE UNITED 
STATES CouRTS OF APPEALS: REEXAMINING STRUCTURE AND PROCESS AFTER A CENTURY OF 
GROWTH (1989). 
82 CoMMITIEE ON LoNG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 25. In addition, the Federal ju-
dicial Center has published a number of splendid monographs on discrete aspects of the 
current crisis in federal appellate procedures. See, e.g., DoNNA SnENSTRA &joE S. CECIL, 
FEDERAL jUDICIAL CENTER, THE ROLE OF STAFF ATIORNEYS AND FACE-To-FACE CONFERENCING 
IN NoN-ARGUMENT DECISIONMAKING (1989). 
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courts.83 Indeed, the twenty-five year history of study coincides almost 
perfectly with the life history of the appellate-expediting devices (re-
duced argument and publication, and increased use of central staff). 
That coincidence is not accidental because both phenomena-end-
less study and the development of two-track justice-are ways of re-
sponding to the caseload glut without changing significantly the size 
and status of the current circuit bench. The "National Study Commis-
sion" will not change that. It will be composed of "the usual suspects": 
judges, legislators, scholars, and members of the public. 84 And it will 
certainly fall prey to the influence and dominance of anti-expansionist 
judges serving as Commission members. Thus, the concern of the ju-
diciary for its own dignitary interests will be overvalued. The pro-
posed Commission is, thus, the bureaucratic equivalent of placing the 
fox in the henhouse85 and will undoubtably produce the standard re-
port calling for a few process reforms and m~or jurisdictional re-
straints. Predictably, Congress will adopt the former and ignore the 
latter, and, at the end of the day, the circuit courts will still be vastly 
overloaded and will still ration justice via the two-track system to keep 
pace. But four more years will have passed, the Learned Hand tradi-
tion will be further devalued, and it will be time for the apologists to 
propose yet another fruitless study. We know what we need to know;86 
it is time to act. 
IV 
THE REn HERRING OF PoLYCENTRISM 
Intermingled with his call for a "National Study Commission" is 
Tobias's argument that the question of proper appellate procedure is 
"polycentric"87 and, therefore, beyond the abilities of the judges to 
83 Tobias cites the "success" of the Federal Courts Study Commission as a model. To-
bias, supra note 2, at 1284. We do not know how it can be called a "success." It changed 
nothing. Not a single one of its jurisdictional recommendations has been introduced in 
Congress-let alone enacted. Worse, since the Commission reported, we believe the sys-
tem has deteriorated even further. See LEoNIDAS MEcHAM, JuDICIAL BusiNESS OF THE 
UNITED STATES CouRTS: 1995 REPORT OF THE DIREGrOR 20 (showing that although no new 
judgeships were authorized betlveen 1991 and 1995, the number of cases filed rose from 
43,027 to 50,072). 
84 Tobias, supra note 2, at 1284. It is unlikely that those chosen will be critics of the 
t'IVo-track system. 
85 Tobias attempts to ameliorate this effect by including significant numbers of nonju-
dicial personnel with diverse perspectives. Id. at 1285. We do not believe that that will 
remove the foxes from the henhouse; the judges will inevitably dominate any committee 
they serve on. 
86 One motive for additional study might be the hope that some data will emerge to 
support the Balkanization or collegiality arguments. That seems most unlikely; the coinci-
dence in those areas betiVeen the intuitive and empirical results is not fortuitous. Further 
study is unlikely to yield supporting data. 
87 Tobias, supra note 2, at 1285, 1287. The concept of polycentrism first appears in an 
essay by Lon L. Fuller, The Fonns and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353 (1978), 
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resolve. A "polycentric" problem is one that defies judicial resolution 
because its solution is so indeterminate that it cannot be captured in a 
reasoned opinion. All judicial problem-solving is polycentric to some 
extent: A decision to suppress illegally obtained evidence or to en-
force the parol evidence rule necessarily entails costs and creates rip-
ple effects throughout society. Striking the proper balance among 
such competing choices can be very difficult. Nevertheless, federal 
courts do not hesitate to make "polycentric" antitrust, national secur-
ity, and products liability decisions that have important national 
ramifications. Given that willingness, we find it difficult to understand 
why the concept of polycentricism should excuse the failure to seek sufficient 
resources to extend equal appellate review procedures to all cases 
within the courts' congressionally-mandated appellate jurisdiction. 
More importantly, there are some trade-offs that courts simply do 
not make, no matter how polycentric a problem might be. The deci-
sion to integrate the nation's schools, for example, although certainly 
indeterminate in some sense, did not invite polycentric hand-wringing 
and redundant study by commissions. The Court ignored competing 
values, viewing the goal of integration as so important that it tran-
scended all countervailing considerations. To label an issue "polycen-
tric," in other words, is simply to record a preference that a vast array 
of competing values receive careful consideration in its solution. 
The point of our article, however, is that attempts to solve the 
problems of the circuit courts have failed precisely because they have 
over-considered and overvalued some trivial interests. The collegiality 
of the courts and the judges' status and job satisfaction may have some 
value, but they do not carry the same weight as the goal of preserving 
the Learned Hand tradition of assuring high quality appellate justice 
to all litigants. The "polycentric" label and the call for more study are 
thus objectionable for the same reason. They are an invitation to con-
sider the comfort and orderliness of the deck chairs as the Titanic 
slips beneath the waves. We believe that equal, high quality justice is a 
transcendent value and that balancing it against trivialities is a funda-
mental moral error. 88 
The most critical flaw in the Tobias argument on polycentrism, 
however, is that it misconstrues the nature of the problem. The 
polycentric label is one used to excuse a court from deciding an issue 
that cannot be solved via traditional legal analysis in a judicial deci-
reprinted in abridged farm in HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SAcKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: 
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPUCATION OF LAw 397-403 (1994) (providing a re-
print of the famous 1958 "tentative" edition). 
88 We emphasize that the fiscal implications of expansion are neither comparatively 
nor proportionally significant with respect to other fiscal authorizations. In any event, it is 
up to Congress to make the "polycentric" trade-off between equal justice and, say, price 
supports for tobacco farming. 
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sion. But, we have not suggested that the judges should themselves de-
cide to add substantial numbers to their rolls. Polycentric or not, the 
problem is one for Congress to solve. Our criticism of the judicial 
establishment is based on its very long-standing reluctance to ask Con-
gress for additional appellate capacity. The failure to lobby for the 
Learned Hand Tradition and to encourage Congress to supply the 
resources needed to permit the courts to live up to their fundamental 
promise that the law is no respecter of persons cannot be excused. 
CoNCLUSION 
Little separates Tobias from us with respect to the existence of 
the problem of appellate decisionmaking procedures or the range of 
possible solutions. Two basic issues, however, do separate us: First, we 
believe we have considered carefully and refuted the anti-expansion-
ists' arguments that have been articulated so far. We do not believe 
that the discussion can be advanced by summarily restating invalid ar-
guments. We would welcome a response to our critiques, but mere 
recitation of discredited positions is not a response. Second, we disa-
gree on the weights to be assigned to the opposing values in the judi-
cial expansion debate. Tobias would call the problem "polycentric," 
consider a set of values we find trivial (if not wrong), and charge a 
commission to balance those values against the Learned Hand tradi-
tion of equal, high quality appellate justice. By contrast, we see that 
tradition as a transcendent value incommensurate with concerns 
about the judges' prestige, status, or job satisfaction. The only way to 
preserve this value is through a radical expansion of the circuit bench; 
we call on the judges to encourage Congress to authorize that expan-
sion. But Congress cannot delay much longer; the tradition must be 
saved while there are still those who remember and cherish it. 
